The Distinction Between the Scope of Section 2(a) and Sections 2(d) and 2€ of the Robinson-Patman Act

Authors

Michigan Law Review, University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a). If the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act to show that the Act's purpose is to maximize consumer welfare by protecting competition. Part II argues that to accomplish this goal, courts should not allow plaintiffs to choose between section 2(a) and section 2(d) or 2(e). Instead, courts should determine if section 2(a) applies, and if it does, should apply section 2(a) to the exclusion of sections 2(d) and 2(e). This result is consistent with the legislative history of the sections and with Supreme Court interpretations of this history. Part III develops an analytical framework for determining whether discriminatory conduct is within the scope of section 2(a) and, if not, whether it is within the scope of sections 2(d) and 2(e).

Recommended Citation

Michigan Law Review, The Distinction Between the Scope of Section 2(a) and Sections 2(d) and 2€ of the Robinson-Patman Act, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1584 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol83/iss6/11