Federalism and Company Law

Authors

Richard M. Buxbaum, Boalt Hall, University of California, BerkeleyFollow

Abstract

It would be a simplifying and historically dubious reduction to equate state interest in corporation law with interventionist or regulatory policies and federal interest with liberal or facilitative ones. So long as a federal legal system presupposes the continuing involvement of two governments with the same subject, however, it is only the subordinate polity's interest in intervention or regulation that makes for interesting reading. State facilitative policies in an era of national facilitative policies raise no questions, and a state's continuing adherence to laissez faire policies when the national government turns interventionist typically creates no conflict. It is only the opposite case that engenders constitutional problems, and thus it is to this case, currently real, that the following discussion is addressed.

Recommended Citation

Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1163 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss5/5