Due Process and Parole Revocation

Authors

Michigan Law Review, University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing •revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) to be given a written statement by the fact-finders of the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. A subsequent case added the right to appointed counsel if the hearing body finds that the parolee asserts a "colorable claim" of innocence.

This Note argues that these protections are inadequate and that additional protections are constitutionally required. Specifically, the procedural rights guaranteed in juvenile-delinquency hearings should be extended to parole revocations so that parolees have (a) the privilege against self-incrimination; (b) an unconditional right to counsel; and (c) the protection of the reasonable-doubt standard of proof.

Recommended Citation

Michigan Law Review, Due Process and Parole Revocation, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 120 (1978).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/10