EQUITY-CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER OR DECREE-ATTORNEY'S RESPONSIBILITY

Authors

Warren K. Urbom S.Ed., University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

Employees of R, while on strike, picketed in the vicinity of a warehouse that was owned by X hut a part of which had been rented by R. The warehouse was served by two railroad spur tracks and two streets. Attempts to deliver goods to the warehouse via the railroad tracks were physically obstructed by the pickets, whereupon a temporary injunction issued restraining employees from "picketing ... plaintiff's railroad tracks and spur tracks or right of way or property in any manner whatsoever .... " Thereafter, on the strength of an attorney's advice, the employees maintained pickets fourteen feet from the railroad tracks, off the property of the railroad company, for the ostensible purpose of deterring trucks from reaching the warehouse by way of the streets. Trainmen were orally advised that the picketing was not directed at the railroad company and that goods could be delivered over the railroad tracks unmolested. In giving his advice the attorney had relied on an earlier decision of the state supreme court holding that similar picketing was primary action rather than action directed at the railroad company. On petition to make the injunction permanent the lower court held the pickets and the attorney in criminal contempt. Held, on appeal, affirmed, two justices dissenting. Although an attorney acts in good faith in interpreting the scope of an injunction, his advice renders him guilty of criminal contempt where the action which he recommends is violative of a lawful injunction. Stewart v. State, (Ark. 1953) 254 s.w. (2d) 55.

Recommended Citation

Warren K. Urbom S.Ed., EQUITY-CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER OR DECREE-ATTORNEY'S RESPONSIBILITY, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1084 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss7/12