AGENCY-IMPUTATION OF AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE TO PRINCIPAL-INSURANCE CONTRACTS

Authors

Robert B. Krueger S.Ed., University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

Defendant insurance company's soliciting agent falsified applicant's warranted answers to material questions in an application for automobile casualty insurance. The applicant signed, not knowing of the nature of the answers. On the basis of these answers, defendant issued a casualty policy on applicant's automobile, containing a clause prohibiting waiver or estoppel as to any of the terms of the contract because of the agent's knowledge. As a result of a subsequent accident, plaintiffs recovered judgments against applicant which applicant failed to satisfy. In an action by plaintiffs against defendant, on supplemental petition, defendant admitted recovery against applicant, but claimed no effective insurance coverage. On motion to certify &om judgments for plaintiffs, held, reversed. The parties to an insurance contract may eliminate the common law rule as to the imputation of the knowledge of an agent to his principal, and if this prevents waiver or estoppel as to terms of the contract, any avoidance provisions may be enforced as written. Fay v. Swicker, 154 Ohio St. 341, 96 N.E. (2d) 196 (1950).

Recommended Citation

Robert B. Krueger S.Ed., AGENCY-IMPUTATION OF AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE TO PRINCIPAL-INSURANCE CONTRACTS, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 761 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss5/8