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Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 30 > Issue 8 (1932)

 

Abstract

The recent decision of Crowell v. Benson by the United States Supreme Court throws interesting light on the constitutionality of delegating final fact-finding powers to administrative tribunals. The case arose under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act which gives deputy commissioners full authority to hear and determine all questions in respect to claims for compensation for disability or death resulting from injuries occurring on the navigable waters of the United States/ The act further provides that if the compensation order is "not in accordance with law" it "may be suspended or set aside in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings . . . instituted in the federal District Court." An award having been made, the employer brought a suit to enjoin its enforcement on the ground that it was in favor of one who, at the time of the injury, was not an employee, and that the claim was therefore not within the jurisdiction of the deputy commissioner. The district judge granted a hearing de novo on the facts and the law, and the evidence having been heard, it was decided that the relation of master and servant was not present at the time of the injury, and the enforcement of the award was restrained. The decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts dissenting. The majority held that the statute must be declared unconstitutional unless it be interpreted as providing a right to a hearing de novo by a court on the questions of whether the injury occurred on the navigable waters of the United States and whether the relation of master and servant existed at the time of the injury. The statute was so construed in order to save its constitutionality.

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