ARE ALL PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS TEMPORARY?

Authors

Abstract

Injunctions may be classified with reference to the stage in the cause at which they are granted, viz. at a preliminary bearing, or at a final bearing, and they may be classified with reference to the time for which they are to stand, viz. for a limited period, or in perpetuity. For the first distinction we have a superfluity of terms. "Temporary," "provisional," "interlocutory," "ad interim" "pendente lite" indicate the first class: "permanent," "perpetual," "final," indicate the second class. But unfortunately several of these terms also suggest the character of the injunction with regard to the other line of classification, touching the time that it is to endure, and there do not appear to be any words in our legal lexicon which mark the second distinction without also suggesting the first. If it were true that all injunctions granted at a final hearing are to stand forever, as it is certainly true that all injunctions granted at a preliminary hearing are to stand for but a limited time, all would be well. But this cannot be true. In patent cases the injunction should be coterminous with the patent and expire with it. The injunction should not extend beyond the period prescribed by the contract in contracts not to compete. In leasehold cases, at the expiration of the term the injunction has served its purpose. In other cases less definite limitations suggest themselves making qualifying conditions highly desirable. An injunction enforcing a bi-lateral contract should be conditioned upon performance by plaintiff, for the uncertainty of performance by both parties is ever present in the enforcement in specie of such agreements. But there is no case in which conditions arising after the decree may not render continuance of the injunction unduly harsh, or even absurd. Though plaintiff in a trespass case is owner in fee, defendant may afterward acquire plaintiff's land. Defendant in the patent case may acquire a license. The contract not to compete may be rescinded. The leasehold may be surrendered. And these are only illustrative of an infinite variety of circumstances which might call for dissolution or modification of the decree.

Recommended Citation

ARE ALL PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS TEMPORARY?, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 382 (1925).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol23/iss4/5