SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PHASES OF THE CUMMINS RAILROAD CONSOLIDATION BILL

Authors

Abstract

The Supreme Court in four decisions has gone far in sustaining Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission in regulating interstate commerce: (1) in sustaining the Adamson Act of 1916, establishing an eight-hour day for interstate railroads. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Ft. Smith, etc. R.R. 71. Mills, 253 U.S. 306 (1920); (2) in sustaining the "recapture" clause in the Transportation Act of 1920 impounding surplus earnings of prosperous railroads, Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, decided January 7, 1924; (3) in sustaining the order of the Commission raising intrastate railroad fares which were so low as to interfere with interstate commerce, Railroad Com. of Wis. 71. C. B. & Q. R.R., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); (4) in sustaining the order of the Commission of 1922 giving to New England railroads a larger proportion of through rates with connecting lines, Akron etc. Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 184 (1923). There is a point, however, beyond which the Supreme Court may not go and finally it may exclaim to Congress and the Commission, "How long, O Catiline, will you abuse our patience?"

Recommended Citation

SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PHASES OF THE CUMMINS RAILROAD CONSOLIDATION BILL, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 579 (1924).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol22/iss6/6