DEEDS--BY AND TO INFANTS--EFFECTI OF DISAFFIRMANCE

Authors

Abstract

The disaffirmance of a contract made by an infant nullifies it and renders it void ab initio; and the parties are returned to the same condition as if the contract had never been made. Grissom v. Beidleman, 35 Okla. 343. This states the general rule both as to executed and executory contracts, and is particularly applicable to transfers of personal property. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 237; PAGE, CONTRACTS, ed. 2, § 1622. Does this principle apply also to conveyances of real property? Does disaffirmance of a deed by or to an infant ipso facto nullify it and revest the parties with their original legal rights and titles? There is almost no direct authority in the texts or cases bearing on these questions. Usually, it seems to be simply taken for granted that disaffirmance does avoid the whole transaction and cause the revesting of title in the grantor. See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, enlarged ed., pp. 2334 to 2337. On the other hand, Professor Williston, after stating the general rule as above, says: "Whether such a destruction of an infant's transfer of real estate by deed can be accomplished without a new transfer may be questioned." WILLISTON, loc. cit., note 65.

Recommended Citation

DEEDS--BY AND TO INFANTS--EFFECTI OF DISAFFIRMANCE, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 52 (1923).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/7