Conspiracy and Social Movements

Authors

Steffen Seitz, University of Denver’s Sturm College of Law

Abstract

Conspiracy prosecutions of social movements are on the rise. From anti-“Cop City” protesters in Atlanta to pro-Palestinian protesters in California, prosecutors are increasingly wielding conspiracy law to suppress social movements. This development is troubling. Social movements have long served as vital engines of democratic self-governance; they crystallize issues, foster public discourse, and mobilize citizens. Yet conspiracy law endangers these movements— and thus democracy—by targeting what makes them work: public expression and social ties between activists.

This Article makes three significant contributions to our understanding of this threat. First, it demonstrates that a charge of conspiracy requires remarkably little—just the appearance of concerted action and an opportunity to create or join a joint scheme. This loose definition of the conspiratorial agreement enables prosecutors to criminalize mere proximity to protest activity and mere sympathy with a movement’s aims. Second, this Article explains why contemporary social movements are especially vulnerable to conspiracy charges. Like their historical counterparts, contemporary movements fundamentally depend on strong social ties between activists. But unlike their predecessors, which built capacity slowly and methodically, today’s movements can use social media to quickly mobilize on a large scale without first building internal competencies. Today’s social movements also generate more public expression than ever before. Conspiracy law weaponizes these dynamics, targeting the strong social ties that sustain these already fragile movements while twisting activists’ public expressions into evidence of criminal intent. Third, drawing on several recent case studies, this Article demonstrates how conspiracy prosecutions exploit these vulnerabilities and undermine entire movements by chilling participation and eroding trust between activists.

Existing doctrinal safeguards fail to protect contemporary social movements from these dangers. Accordingly, this Article advocates a bold solution: effectively abolishing conspiracy charges for social movement conduct by removing certain predicate offenses from the scope of conspiracy. This reform would help preserve the vital role of social movements in American democracy without unduly sacrificing public order.

Recommended Citation

Steffen Seitz, Conspiracy and Social Movements, 124 Mich. L. Rev. 609 (2026).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol124/iss4/2