Valuing Control

Authors

Peter DiCola, Northwestern University School of LawFollow

Abstract

Control over property is valuable in and of itself. Scholars have not fully recognized or explored that straightforward premise, which has profound implications for the economic analysis of property rights. A party to a property dispute may actually prefer liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting with the other party to liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting with her. This Article presents a novel economic model that determines the conditions under which that is the case—by taking account of how parties value control. The model suggests new opportunities for policymakers to resolve conflicts and to develop better information about property disputes through policy experiments. The Article provides recommendations for implementing this new approach and suggests applications in the areas of copyright, trademark, patent, and privacy law.

Recommended Citation

Peter DiCola, Valuing Control, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 663 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol113/iss5/2