Reclaiming Interpretation: PSGs, Asylum Law, and the Post-Loper Bright Landscape

Authors

Andrew Elkins, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada–Las Vegas

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo marked the end of Chevron deference, reshaping the framework that courts must use when reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. This Note examines the consequences of that doctrinal shift in the context of U.S. asylum law, where statutory ambiguity and agency discretion have long played a central role. Focusing on the “particular social group” (PSG) ground for asylum, this Note argues that Loper Bright requires courts to reclaim primary responsibility for interpreting asylum statutes. It analyzes how Chevron deference previously empowered the Board of Immigration Appeals to issue binding interpretations with significant human consequences and assesses early post-Loper Bright responses in the federal courts. Ultimately, the Note contends that a more rigorous, court-centered interpretive approach better aligns with both the principles underlying Loper Bright and the humanitarian obligations embedded in asylum law.

Recommended Citation

Andrew Elkins, Reclaiming Interpretation: PSGs, Asylum Law, and the Post-Loper Bright Landscape, 15 Mich. J. Env't. & Admin. L. 103 (2025).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol15/iss1/4