Chevron's 51 Imperfect Solutions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2024
Abstract
In June 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the judicial deference federal agencies previously received for their statutory interpretations, overturning the Court’s landmark 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. While Chevron was never binding on state courts, where the balance of powers and state constitutions may require different or no deference to agencies, numerous states have adopted Chevron deference, Skidmore weight, or similar deference regimes for judicial review of agency legal interpretations. Despite these developments, little scholarly attention has been paid to how and why states have developed administrative law’s deference doctrines, how the doctrines have changed over time, or how they may further evolve in light of Chevron’s demise at the federal level.
In our contribution to this Fourth Annual Public Law in the States Conference, we provide a literature review of and update on the scholarship to date. Ultimately, we encourage states to not follow the Supreme Court in lockstep when it comes to judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
Federal and state governments differ in important respects, and judicial deference similar to Chevron may still have great benefits in at least some states. We also present the preliminary findings from a comprehensive dataset that one of us, Neena Menon, has compiled on judicial deference in state courts that examines the relationship between state-level politics and the corresponding changes in deference regimes. This dataset provides a more nuanced look at the political ties of state courts that choose between different deference regimes. The findings from this dataset are especially important to our understanding of the political dynamics of Chevron—a doctrine that conservatives seemed to embrace originally and have since criticized perhaps vice versa for progressives). Tracking the political makeup of state courts during times of deference regime change can show whether and how the politics of courts can affect the relationship between states’ judicial and executive bodies.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Christopher J. and Menon, Neena, "Chevron's 51 Imperfect Solutions" (2024). Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers. 43.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/pub_law_archive/43