Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 51 > Issue 8 (1953)
Abstract
The current furor concerning the treaty-making power of the United States has been aroused by the apprehension that this country might become a party to certain multilateral treaties in the social and economic fields, and, notably, the draft Covenants on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and the Convention on Political Rights of Women. The plethora of proposed constitutional amendments now before the Congress merely marks an intensification of the controversy, recurrent throughout our history, concerning the legal effect of Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States. Problems concerning the relative authority of treaties and other international agreements, on the one hand, and of the Constitution, Acts of Congress, and state constitutions and legislation, on the other, have led to proposals for a change in a law and practice which have become traditional in this country. These far-reaching proposals would sweep away well-established constitutional land-marks, and would, in effect, involve a repeal of the fundamental rule, hitherto unquestioned, that "all treaties made ... under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land .... "
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Preuss,
ON AMENDING THE TREATY-MAKING POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES,
51
Mich. L. Rev.
1117
(1953).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss8/2
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