CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RESTRICTIONS UPON ADVERTISING

Authors

Joseph M. Kortenhof, University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

In its efforts to combat gasoline price wars and the fraud that allegedly accompanied them, the City of Pontiac enacted an ordinance designed to restrict the scope of gasoline advertising. It provided that: "No sign or placard stating the price or prices of gasoline other than such signs or placards as hereinabove provided [signs not larger than 12 by 12 inches attached to pumps] shall be posted or maintained on the premises on which said gasoline is sold or offered for sale." Defendant retailed gasoline; by combining hauling and retailing into one operation, savings of about four cents a gallon were effected which were passed on to the consumer. Defendant advertised these savings on signs larger than the ordinance specified: The city prosecuted defendant for violation of the ordinance and the circuit court·found that the ordinance was unconstitutional. On appeal, held, affirmed. The ordinance was in conflict with Article 2, Section 4, of the Michigan Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it bore no reasonable relation to public peace, health, morals, welfare, or safety. Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100, 49 N.W. (2d) 80 (1951).

Recommended Citation

Joseph M. Kortenhof, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RESTRICTIONS UPON ADVERTISING, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 766 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol50/iss5/10