Standard Oil sold gasoline to "jobber" customers at a price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held that Standard's price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard contended that the differential was established in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, and the trial examiner made a finding supporting this contention. The F.T.C. made no finding on the point, holding that under the act, the defense of meeting a competitor's price only rebuts the prima facie case that arises from a showing of discrimination, and that it is immaterial when, as here, there is affirmative proof that the discrimination injured, destroyed, and prevented competition. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, held, three justices dissenting, reversed and remanded for a finding by the commission whether the price reduction was in good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Such a finding establishes a complete defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,. (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct 240.
Willis B. Snell S. Ed.,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT-DEFENSE OF MEETING A COMPETITOR'S PRICE,
Mich. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol49/iss6/43