The Federal Administrative Procedure Act received its first thorough consideration by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. The Court held that deportation proceedings must conform to section 5, which provides for notice, opportunity for a hearing, separation of prosecution and quasi-judicial functions, and the issuance of declaratory orders by the agency, and to section 11, which prescribes an independent status for presiding officers. The scope of section 5 is limited to administrative adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." There is no specific requirement "in the Immigration Act, the applicable legislation in this field, for a hearing before an alien can be deported. A hearing, however, has long been deemed necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process, and such hearings have been held before immigration inspectors who do not satisfy the requirements of section 11. Thus, in reaching its decision, the Court (in a 7 to 1 decision) interpreted the words "required by statute," as found in section 5, to include hearings required by statute either in express terms or by judicial interpretation. This compels an important change in immigration hearing procedures.
Fred W. Freeman S.Ed.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT-THE SUPREME COURT GIVES THE ACT ITS FIRST INTERPRETATION,
Mich. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol48/iss8/5