Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 48 > Issue 7 (1950)
Abstract
That a corporation is a "person" for certain purposes within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore entitled to invoke its protection, is considered by students of constitutional law to be well settled. For that reason the dissent of Justice Douglas in the recent case of Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander demands more than passing recognition. Therein he restates and adds his support to the view of Justice Black that the word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment refers exclusively to human beings and affords no protection whatsoever to corporations against arbitrary state action.
Recommended Citation
Robert P. Griffin S.Ed.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CORPORATIONS-ARTIFICIAL "PERSONS" AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
48
Mich. L. Rev.
983
(1950).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol48/iss7/5
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Business Organizations Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons