HABEAS CORPUS-USE AS A REMEDY WHERE THE APPEAL PROCESS HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED

Authors

W. Stirling Maxwell, University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

Kulick, a Jehovah's Witness, registered under the Selective Service Act of 1940 and, though he claimed an exemption as a minister, his local draft board classified him 1-A. After he had exhausted his administrative remedies to have this classification changed, he reported for induction, as ordered, but refused to take the oath. For this refusal he was convicted under the provisions of the act and, on May 7, 1945, sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years. On the ground that under the Supreme Court's decision of Falbo v. United States the local board's classification was not open to attack in such a trial, the district court did not permit Kulick to develop as a defense his contention that the board's classification was invalid. Kulick did not appeal before the time allotted therefore expired on May 12, 1945. On February 4, 1946, the Supreme Court held, in Estep v. United States, and the "rule" of the Falbo case did not apply where the defendant had exhausted his administrative remedies for a reclassification. Kulick thereafter sought habeas corpus in the federal district court, but the writ was denied. On appeal to the circuit court, Kulick was ordered discharged. On certiorari, held, reversed. Since Kulick did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court and "since we find no exceptional circumstances which excuse [his] failure, habeas corpus may not now be used as a substitute." Three justices dissented. Sunal v. Large, Alexander v. United States ex rel. Kulick, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588 (1947).

Recommended Citation

W. S. Maxwell, HABEAS CORPUS-USE AS A REMEDY WHERE THE APPEAL PROCESS HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/16