CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO HAVE COUNSEL APPOINTED BY THE COURT

Authors

Frank H. Roberts, University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

On May 16, 1932, petitioner, then seventeen years of age, was arraigned, tried, convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner was without legal assistance throughout these proceedings, was never advised of his rights to counsel, was never informed of the consequences of a guilty plea and, as disclosed by the record, was considerably confused as to the effect of such plea. In 1945, he moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which he was convicted, on the ground that there had been serious impairment of his constitutional rights at the arraignment and trial. On appeal the Supreme Court of Michigan held that there was no error in the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, per curiam. De Meerleer v. People of the State of Michigan, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 596.

Recommended Citation

Frank H. Roberts, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO HAVE COUNSEL APPOINTED BY THE COURT, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 (1947).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol45/iss8/8