Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 45 > Issue 1 (1946)
Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission in proceedings under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act found, inter alia, that petitioner, a manufacturer of overcoats, used a deceptive and misleading trade name, Alpacuna, which induced the erroneous belief that its coats contained vicuna. The commission issued a cease and desist order banning the use of the word Alpacuna to describe petitioner's coats. The circuit court of appeals found that the commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence, but felt that the remedy was unduly harsh because of the fact that the public interest could have been adequately protected by using qualifying language. The court indicated that it would have modified the order under the doctrine of Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., but it thought subsequent decisions involving other administrative agencies had limited the right of the court to modify the remedy prescribed in an order of the commission, and that the control of the remedy lay exclusively with the commission. Held, Congress by the Federal Trade Commission Act has not limited the reviewing court to an a:ffirmance or reversal but has given the court power to modify an order, and this power extends to the remedy prescribed by the commission as Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co. indicated. It was further held that, as in the case of orders of other administrative agencies under comparable statutes, judicial review of Trade Commission orders was limited, and with respect to the remedy, it extends no further than to ascertain if the commission in making its choice of the remedy has exceeded reasonable limits. The commission is the expert body empowered to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practice, and the court will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practice. Since the commission in the present case has not considered whether the ends of the act could be satisfied, and the trade name saved by the use of qualifying language, and since its expert opinion is entitled to great weight, the court will not pass on the question of whether the limits of discretion have been exceeded until the commission has made the above determination. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 758.
Recommended Citation
John W. Potter S.Ed.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE CHOICE OF REMEDY-MODIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER BY COURT,
45
Mich. L. Rev.
92
(1946).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/6