A Minnesota statute, dealing with the regulation of common carriers and requiring permits for operating as such, contained the following language: "The terms 'common carrier' and 'contract carrier' shall not apply to any person engaged in the business of operating motor vehicles in the transportation of property exclusively within the zone circumscribed by a line running parallel to the corporate limits of any city or village or contiguous cities and/or villages and 35 miles distant therefrom when such person resides within the zone." The plaintiff claimed that under that provision he was not required to secure a permit for his limited operations. The Railroad and Warehouse Commission and the Attorney General insisted that the permit requirement applied to plaintiff and had imposed fines and other penalties upon him. He started action for declaratory judgment to determine the rights and duties of the parties. Defendants, the Attorney General and members of the commission, in their answer joined in seeking a construction of the statute "asserting that the provision here considered is vague, uncertain, and indefinite in its language, making interpretation difficult, if not impossible." Held, the quoted part of the statute is "unconstitutional for indefiniteness," hence void. Anderson v. Burnquist, (Minn. 1943) 11 N.W. (2d) 776.
R. W. A.,
STATUTES--LEGISLATION IN VAGUE TERMS,
Mich. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol42/iss5/13