Plaintiff's automobile was damaged when it collided with a horse belonging to the defendant. The animal's running at large upon the highway claimed to be in violation of a statute which required owners of stock and domestic animals to restrain and prevent such animals from running at large. Held, the purpose of the statute is to protect agricultural crops from the ravages of straying animals, and not to protect motorists on the highway; therefore, the plaintiff is not of the class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, nor his injuries of the type sought to be prevented; thus its violation is not prima facie evidence of negligence, and plaintiff must affirmatively prove negligence on the part of the defendant. Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okla. 153, 86 P. (2d) 61 (1938).
Michigan Law Review,
NEGLIGENCE - VIOLATION OF A STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE -- TYPE OF HARM PREVENTED AND CLASS OF PERSONS TO BE BENEFITED,
Mich. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss5/20