Testator was the donee of general powers of appointment conferred upon him by his mother's deed and will. By the ninth clause of this will he gave to two named persons "all the rest and residue of my personal property . . . to be divided equitably among the members of said two families as they may in their uncontrolled discretion decide." Held, this did not exercise the powers of appointment. Evidence was admitted to show the testator's knowledge of the nature and scope of his property and of the fact that his estate was being diminished by the expenditure of principal; to show further the varying degrees of intimacy involved in his relation to the principal beneficiaries of the will, on the one hand, and the takers in default of appointment, on the other; to show also that shortly before making his will he took pains through correspondence with the plaintiff to know how much property there was, to verify the existence of the power of appointment; and to show that he had in mind that he possessed such a power when he executed his will. All this evidence was admitted to enable the court to ascertain as nearly as possible with what purpose the words of the will were employed. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, (Mass. 1935) 195 N. E. 793.