In the recent case of Diuguid v. Bethel African M. E. Church of Pittsburgh the plaintiff, a painting contractor, had entered into a written agreement with the board of trustees of the defendant, a religious corporation, providing for painting and decorating the interior of the latter's church building. The work was to be supervised by a "house committee" consisting of three members selected from the board of trustees of the church. After completing this work, plaintiff proceeded to make additional improvements in the basement of the church, purporting to act in pursuance of a subsequent oral contract which plaintiff alleged had been made between himself and the defendant, acting through its "house committee." The "house committee" had not been expressly delegated with authority to make such contracts, such authority being reserved, by the by-laws, to the board of trustees, acting as a board. Plaintiff sued on the oral contract for the additional work done. The court held that, although the members of the "house committee" had no express authority to do so, they at least had apparent authority to make such a contract, and that, therefore, the defendant was liable.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSONS FOR ACTS WITHIN THE APPARENT AUTHORITY OF THE AGENT,
Mich. L. Rev.
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