CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MARTIAL LAW-SUSPENSION OF THE LAW

Authors

Abstract

Fifteen thousand workmen in a county struck, forced business houses to close, cut off the milk supply even to hospitals, threatened electric and water company employees with violence, stopped all transportation services, and congregated in mobs. On request of the local authorities the governor issued a proclamation suspending the right to carry arms, the right of assembly, and the right to enter or leave the county, and directed the military to disperse all crowds, picketers, or other assemblages. A striker imprisoned by the military forces sued to enjoin the governor and military officials from carrying out the proclamation on the ground it violated a provision of the state constitution reading: "The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly." The statutory federal three-judge district court denied an injunction and held that it had jurisdiction, but that the governor under his duty to enforce the laws had a discretionary power, which he had not abused, to declare martial law and to imprison without the rights of habeas corpus or trial by jury. Cox v. McNutt, (D. C. Ind. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 355.

Recommended Citation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MARTIAL LAW-SUSPENSION OF THE LAW, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 417 (1936).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol34/iss3/14