The defendant owned property next to a lake which he subdivided into residential lots for the purpose of establishing a summer resort colony. In 1924 he sold one of the lots some distance back from the lake to the plaintiff, and during the negotiations for such sale it was represented that all the lots which bordered on the lake, both in front of and on both sides of the plaintiff's lot, would be improved as a park, that no buildings would be put upon them, and that the plaintiff would have a quiet summer home with an unobstructed view of the lake. The plaintiff's contract gave him the "perpetual use" of all these lakeside lots in common with the other lot owners "in passing to and from Cass Lake." In 1925 the defendant erected a club house on the proposed park some distance to the side of the plaintiff's lot. He had written several letters to the plaintiff asking his permission to do this but none had been answered. The plaintiff, after this, paid the two-thirds balance on the purchase price and in 1928 accepted a deed in the same words as the contract. In 1929 he filed a bill for an injunction for the removal of the club house. The majority of the court held that all of the plaintiff's rights must come from the deed, and since it only gave an easement of reasonable passage the building was no violation of the plaintiff's rights. In reaching this decision the court stressed the plaintiff's long delay and acquiescence. Justice Potter (dissenting) thought that the easement claimed was expressly granted by the deed. Kirby v. Meyering Land Co., (Mich. 1932) 244 N. W. 433·