Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 31 > Issue 6 (1933)
Abstract
In a recent North Carolina case a trustee under a deed of trust brought suit for specific performance against defendant who was the highest bidder, subject to approval of title, at a public sale of the property. Defendant contended that the trustee could not convey a title in fee since the deed to his grantor was "to R. W. for life with remainder to his bodily heirs by ------ if any," otherwise to another. Held, that defendant must perform his contract since the deed in question gave R. W. a contingent fee tail under the rule in Shelley's case, which became a fee simple by the North Carolina statute and absolute by fulfillment of the condition, R. W. having had children. Glenn v. Ashby, 202 N. C. 244, 162 S. E. 555 (1932).
Recommended Citation
FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE,
31
Mich. L. Rev.
854
(1933).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol31/iss6/18