In driving his automobile plaintiff approached a "stop" street and stopped his car as required by law; he then entered the intersection and collided with defendant's car, which approached from plaintiff's left on the "through" street. On the trial of an action for the resulting damage the court instructed the jury that the vehicle on the through street "shall have right of way over all other vehicles approaching or traveling upon all streets intersecting said designated boulevard." Held, such instruction is erroneous, for the ordinance did not give the traveler on the through street right of way over cars coming from the right; on the contrary, as to such cars the situation was governed by the general statutory provision giving at intersections the right of way to the car from the right. After plaintiff had stopped, as required, he was entitled to the benefit of the general right of way provision. Dikel v. Mathers (Iowa 1931) 238 N. W. 615.