The defendant was indicted in September, 1930, for having robbed a bank in August, 1927. At the time of his act, the statute of limitation of actions required that prosecutions for certain offenses be commenced within five years after the act, and included in this group the crime termed "robbery." Prosecutions for other offenses were barred after two years. In May, 1929, a new statute provided that prosecutions for felonies be commenced within five years after commission of the act by the accused. The defendant contended that robbing a bank was not within the scope of the term "robbery" as used in the first statute and that his offense was, therefore, barred by the two-year period which had run prior to the return of the indictment. Refusing to determine the nature of the defendant's act, the court held, if the act was within the scope of the term "robbery," the original five-year period had not run, and if it was not, the new five-year period, taking effect prior to the expiration of the old two-year period, was effective to extend the period for the legal return of the indictment. Streepy v. State (Ind. I 931) 177 N. E. 897.