CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POLICE POWER-JUNK YARDS

Authors

Abstract

The City of Ashland, Kentucky, acting under a specific power to license and regulate junk yards granted to it by the legislature under section 3058-2 Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1922) passed an ordinance requiring applicants for licenses to operate junk yards within the city of Ashland. "to make and execute with the Clerk of the City of Ashland, Kentucky, a permit signed by the applicant providing that the Police Department * * * may inspect and search the said shop or place of business." The appellant complied with all other requirements, but refused to execute the permit: Because the clerk would not issue the license, unless aμd until the permit was filed, appellant brought this action to compel its issuance. Appellant contended that the ordinance was unconstitutional, in that it deprived him of a property right without due process of law, and in that it permitted search and seizure without a warrant in contravention of section 10 of the Kentucky constitution. The city of Ashland contended and the majority of the court held that the ordinance did not take property without due process of law and did not authorize a prohibited search and seizure, because it was a reasonable exercise of the police power. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 30 S.W.(2d) 968.

Recommended Citation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POLICE POWER-JUNK YARDS, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 628 (1931).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol29/iss5/17