The federal bench has, in general, been effective. Its independence has been a virtue which has outweighed even the defects in organization which will be presently pointed out. Nevertheless, these defects have had their effect on the federal judiciary and its reputation. Individual federal judges and the powers of federal judges in general are subjected in Congress and elsewhere to an unending series of attacks. Sooner or later an accumulation of irritation may attain enough force to shear the federal bench of some of its essential powers or destroy its principal source of strength: tenure during good behavior. The way to meet such dangers and forestall worse remedies, like recall, election of federal judges for short terms, and other popular nostrums, is to improve the organization of the federal bench within constitutional lines already fixed. The fundamental faults are faults in organization which no amount of tinkering with rules of practice or procedure will ever correct. In this sense three changes in the organization of the federal bench are put forward in the articles to follow: (1) Judicial appointment of district and circuit judges; (2) Judicial supervision over district and circuit judges; (3) judicial removal of unfit district and circuit judges. To each concrete proposal, One paper will be devoted; it will be shown that the change proposed is desirable and is possible without constitutional amendment.

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