DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION

Authors

Fowler Vincent Harper, University of North Dakota

Abstract

State interference with conditions of employment, as determined by the strength of the contracting parties, by imposing requirements calculated to protect the safety and health of employees, has not been without interruption from the courts. In the earlier cases, when organized labor was not strong enough to enforce the most reasonable demands without assistance from the legislature, the courts were wont to look with astute eye upon the infringement of liberty of contract thus resulting. When the reasoning started with the assumption that liberty of contract was the rule and the employment of the police power of the State the exception, a decision unfavorable to labor invariably resulted. The conception of this liberty of contract as an absolute right with but few, if any, qualifications, provided a premise from which but one result could emanate. Any logical deduction therefrom was inevitably bound to result in the invalidation of statutes imposing health and safety requirements upon those who employ labor. When, however, opinions started with the qualified conception of liberty of contract with the police power, not as the exception, but as the general principle applicable, a weighing of interests usually resulted, which might or might not produce a result sustaining the statute.

Recommended Citation

Fowler V. Harper, DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 763 (1928).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol26/iss7/4