CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF LIQUOR

Authors

Abstract

The Michigan court has recently declared the state statute prohibiting the mere possession of liquor to be constitutional. People v. Burt, 236 Mich. 62, 210 N. W. 97. The court does not enter into any: discussion as to the constitutionality, but relies on a previous decision, People v. Stambosva, 210 Mich. 436, 178 N. W. 226. This phase of the case is stressed, however, in a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Bird, who denies that the Stambosva case is controlling. That case held the statutory provision in question to be valid, as not violative of due process, but did not discuss the point raised in the dissent to the Burt case, which depends chiefly on the fact that the Michigan constitution says nothing about possession. While the prohibition amendment forbids the manufacture, sale or keeping for sale, giving away, bartering, furnishing or otherwise disposing of intoxicants, the Wiley Law, as amended in 1919, declares unlawful the transportation or possession of liquor, in addition to those acts prohibited by the constitution. By applying the rule of construction, that the expression of one thing necessarily excludes all other things, it is maintained that the legislature in adding another inhibition to those prescribed in the fundamental law has gone beyond its powers. "The amendment," says the learned Chief Justice, "is clearly a limitation upon the power of the legislature." He contends, also, that the enactment has added a burden to the enforcement of the amendment, by adding thousands of liquor violators daily.

Recommended Citation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF LIQUOR, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 784 (1927).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol25/iss7/7