JURISTIC IDEALISM AND LEGAL PRACTICE

Authors

Joseph H. Drake, University of Michigan Law School

Abstract

The relation of the "idea" of just law to the "principles" [Grundsaetze] of just law and the "model" [Vorbild] of just law is somewhat difficult to grasp and Stammler's application of the idea, through the intermediate principles and model, to the practice of just law, has given much trouble to the critics. A rule of law may be thought of as a particular conclusion, a principle as a general conclusion, while a standard or norm is a means of reaching conclusions. This is of course the old logical division of conceptions into particular, general and universal, and is at the basis of the division of law by the classical Roman jurists into jus civile, just gentium and jus naturale. These distinctions are useful in differentiating the science of law, as presented in historical and comparative jurisprudence, from the philosophy of law, which deals with concepts of unconditioned universal validity, but they are not pertinent here.

Recommended Citation

Joseph H. Drake, JURISTIC IDEALISM AND LEGAL PRACTICE, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1927).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol25/iss7/4