Home > Journals > Michigan Law Review > MLR > Volume 24 > Issue 4 (1926)
Abstract
It has been laid down that as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel has no application to infants. 31 C. J. 1005; 22 CYC. 512. But many cases recognize an exception to this general rule, where the infant has reached the age of discretion and has intentionally and fraudulently made misrepresentations. A common case is that in which the infant has induced a person to enter into a contract with him, by fraudulently representing himself to be of age. As to whether or not he will be estopped from setting up his infancy, in a suit on such contract, there are two diametrically opposite views. One is that since the action is based on contract, the infant cannot be denied his right of avoiding liability and so cannot be estopped from asserting his infancy. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722. The other allows the doctrine of estoppel to be raised against him. Looney v. Elkhorn Land & Improvement Co. 195 Ky. 198, 242 S. W. 27.
Recommended Citation
INFANTS' CONTRACTS--APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL WHEN INFANT HAS MISPRESENTED AGE,
24
Mich. L. Rev.
391
(1926).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/5