Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Abstract

The harmful effects of climate change have already arrived in cities and states across America, with disasters increasing markedly in recent years along with more gradual environmental changes like sea-level rise and drought. To protect populations and natural resources, significant funding will be necessary for preventative measures as well as disaster response.

At present, it is states and ordinary taxpayers who must shoulder the enormous costs and planning for climate adaptation. A number of state legislators, however, have recently proposed enacting new laws that would require the companies who have most profited from fossil fuel usage to assist in funding climate adaptation projects. Based on prior liability regimes to deal with hazardous waste harms, these “state climate superfunds” aim to address the unfair distribution of climate adaptation costs and provide an essential complement to regulation of future greenhouse gas emissions.

Drawing on historical, economic, and political science literature, this Article examines these novel proposals and the potential constitutional issues with states passing such laws. It argues that the local nature of climate change harms, the historic role states have played in protecting the environment, and the benefits from decentralized policy experimentation support state leadership on climate superfunds. While certain constitutional provisions and doctrines could limit state authority to draft these laws in particular ways, the Article describes how states can design climate superfunds to conform with prior legal precedents and reasonably balance the competing values at stake as we adapt to a warmer world.

Download


Share

COinS