"Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia: Brief of Statutory Interpretation " by Richard Primus
 

Document Type

Brief

Publication Date

7-3-2019

Abstract

Amici are law professors who specialize in statutory interpretation and/or equality law issues. Amici are well versed in this Court's statutory interpretation and Title VII precedents and have written on these issues. Although amici have otherwise diverse views, they agree that a textualist analysis compels the conclusion that discrimination against individuals because of their sexual orientation or their transgender status is a form of discrimination "because of ... sex" within the meaning of Title VII.

The question presented in these cases is whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against individuals because of their sexual orientation or their transgender status. This Court's analysis of this question should begin and end with Title VII's text, which prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against an individual "because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As this Court has repeatedly recognized, an employer has acted "because of... sex" where an individual's sex is a "but for" cause of the employer's actions. See, e.g., City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And at the time of Title VII's enactment, the word "sex" meant, at a minimum, "biological" sex. See infra at 6. Given the meaning of these terms at the time of Title VII's enactment, every instance of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination occurs "because of . .. sex"-that is, it would not have occurred but for the individual's "biological sex."

Comments

Amicus: Ball, Professor Carlos A.; Eichner, Professor Maxine; Eyer, Professor Katie; Krishnakumar, Professor Anita S.; Lau, Professor Holning; Primus, Professor Richard; Strauss, Professor David A.; Wolff, Professor Tobias Barrington

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