Why have Russian enterprises performed so poorly since privatization? This is a problem with many answers, each independently sufficient: the bleak mix includes vacillating macroeconomic policy, endemic corruption, a corrosive tax structure, poor human capital, and so forth. Even well-performing companies must hide good results because visible profits or dividends provoke confiscatory taxation and mafia visits. In such a difficult environment, the rule of law generally, and corporate governance in particular, may seem not to count. Macroeconomic implosions dwarf subtle distinctions in corporate dividend rules or minority voting rights.
Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Heller, Michael A. "A Property Theory Perspective on Russian Enterprise Reform." In Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies, edited by P. Murrell, 288-313. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2001.