Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2011
Abstract
Michael Carrier's case study on Provigil' offers new support for the view that Big Pharma is to blame for stymieing competition, retarding innovation, and inflating prices in the drug industry. Carrier argues that Cephalon was able to thwart generic entry by a combination of anticompetitive strategies. It entered into a reverse payment settlement agreement with generics seeking to enter the market. These settlements purported to allow generic entry before the expiration of the patent period, but, according to Carrier, the promise of early entry was negated by the second prong of Cephalon's anticompetitive strategy. During the time that it had bought by the patent settlement, Cephalon rolled out a new sleep disorder drug-Nuvigil-supposedly to frustrate generic entry.
Recommended Citation
Crane, Daniel A. "Provigil: A Commentary." Hastings Sci. & Tech. L. J. 3, no. 2 (2011): 453-7.
Included in
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Marketing Law Commons