TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE AND WIRELESS-TAPPING

Authors

Abstract

A recent Federal case, Olmstead v. United States, suggests an interesting problem. Evidence obtained by Federal authorities, who tapped private telephone wires, was admitted in a criminal prosecution. It seems to be the general rule that fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally procured evidence is admissible, if otherwise admissible. And certainly the courts have required telegraph companies to disclose messages to aid criminal prosecutions. Telegraph operators have been compelled to testify. And even where a state statute forbade disclosure of the message by the company, a subpoena duces tecum has compelled the production of a telegram to aid the courts. Testimony of an individual who "listened in" over the telephone has also been admitted. But disregarding the evidentiary phase of the matter, a phase influenced by public policy and the desirability of aiding the courts, what are the rights of the sender of a communication against a tapper, not engaged in collecting evidence for prosecution?

Recommended Citation

TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE AND WIRELESS-TAPPING, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 313 (1928).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol26/iss3/8