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Abstract

Here is often complaint that the decisions of the courts are unjust. Probably such complaints have always existed, and they may be no greater to-day than usual. Often, perhaps usually, defeated suitors feel that they have suffered injjustice. There is a public feeling that the rules of law produce much delay in criminal cases, that convictions are set aside by the higher courts for what seem trivial reasons, and that often in consequence the guilty escape. Civil cases do not attract so much public attention, but perhaps there is as great cause of complaint in the repeated trials, rendered necessary when the lower courts err in the rules of law they apply. "The glorious uncertainty" of the law is to-day, as it has probably always been, a common charge against courts. There is much public impatience, when measures which seem desirable cannot be speedily effected through the law. A striking illustration of this was shown in the recent strike of the coal miners. Our papers teemed with suggestions of summary methods of compelling the operators to yield, without reference to their legal rights. These complaints have probably much foundation. Out of them has come a growing public feeling, that speedy justice should be done in each case, though to effect this the rules of law have to be bent or broken. This feeling appears to have reached the courts, and some legislatures. I have heard that a judge of the supreme court of Michigan, now deceased, declared that if he could ascertain the justice of a cause before him, he cared nothing for the law.

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