This Essay proposes that, in order to avoid imposing arbitrary (and perhaps unnecessarily large) fines for false patent marking, courts should seek guidance in the law of remedies for false advertising and copyright infringement. In particular, courts should attempt to approximate the social harm caused by actionable false marking by taking into account (1) the plaintiff's loss (if any) and the defendant's gain (if any) attributable to the false marking at issue; (2) the plausibility of substantial but less easily quantifiable harms to consumers and to nonparty competitors; and (3) the risks, on the one hand, of underdeterring statutory violations if the penalty is too small and, on the other, of chilling patentees from lawfully marking their products if the risk of liability is too great. In cases in which the likely social harm from false marking appears minimal, courts should not be reluctant to impose only nominal fines.
Thomas F. Cotter,
Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking,
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol17/iss1/4