This article will proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main provisions of the MLI. Section 3 discusses the purpose of tax treaties in the twenty-first century, because it can be argued that they are less necessary under conditions of tax competition. Section 4 raises the question whether tax treaties can be improved short of a full-fledged multilateral tax treaty by inserting a most favored nation (MFN) provision similar to those found in bilateral investment treaties. Such an MFN provision operates over time to create a de facto multilateral treaty without the negotiation of one. Section 5 concludes this article.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu,
A Global Treaty Override? The New OECD Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Limits,
Mich. J. Int'l L.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol39/iss2/2