The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Sec Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence

Authors

David C. Weiss, University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow

Abstract

This Note uses examples such as Titan Corp. to support the argument that there are reasons to question the United States' increasing reliance on disgorgement to enforce the FCPA. Despite obvious deterrence benefits, the SEC's quest for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains raises significant questions regarding extraterritoriality, proportionality, and evidentiary uncertainty. This Note looks to the history of the FCPA and both international anti-bribery agreements and foreign statutes implementing those agreements in arguing that U.S. and foreign regulators need to create a more certain, predictable enforcement climate as the number of foreign bribery enforcement actions continue to explode.

Recommended Citation

David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Sec Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 Mich. J. Int'l L. 471 (2009).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol30/iss2/4