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Abstract

The commodification of reproductive material evokes different responses. Some argue that the sale of reproductive material should be prohibited. Others argue in favor of unfettered baby markets on principle or to achieve broad-scale access to reproductive technologies. In this Article, the author responds to the emergence of baby markets with great skepticism, but reluctant acceptance. Drawing on a relational conception of autonomy and self-definition, she argues that commodification of reproductive material is intrinsically harmful. Moreover, such commodification poses a number of consequential harms. Nevertheless, in spite of these concerns, the author "gives in" to baby markets, which is to say she does not argue for the prohibition of these markets, but instead for their regulation and oversight. The author gives in to baby markets in part because of the great impracticality of prohibiting markets given how well entrenched they are; people have been buying and selling reproductive material for some time. In addition, although there are risks of markets, the risk-benefit calculus calls for allowing markets to exist, provided there is careful and serious regulation of such markets. In other words, the author is not willing to accept completely free and unfettered markets.

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