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Response or Comment

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It has frequently been said that the Seventh Section of the Statute of Frauds, concerning Trusts of land, requires a writing containing "all the terms of the trust." Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 707; Smith v. Matthews, 3 DeG., F. & J. 139; Loring v. Palmer, 118 U. S. 321; Gaylord v. Lafayette, 115 Ind. 423; McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500; Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484; York v. Perrine, 71 Mich. 567; Newkirk v. Place, 47 N. J. Eq. 477; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1; Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 156; Dillaye v. Greenough, 45 N. Y. 438; Dyer's Appeal, 107 Pa. 446; McCandless v. Warner, 26 W. Va. 754. This doctrine comes to the test in a case where there is a writing, signed by the person who is enabled to declare the trust, sufficiently identifying the land, and declaring that it is held in trust, but without naming the beneficiaries or otherwise failing to meet the stated requirement, but where parol evidence sufficiently establishes the terms of the trust to enable the court to enforce it if the Statute does not prevent In such a case, does the Statute render the trust unenforcible? It is submitted that it does not.