"Peaceful picketing," the United States Supreme Court has said, "is the workingman's means of communication."' One line of analysis is that, as a means of communication, picketing is free speech and is therefore entitled to every constitutional protection afforded other forms of expression. This means that it cannot be subjected to special restrictions, such as antiboycott curbs, simply because it is picketing. The opposing line of analysis is that picketing is not simply speech; it is "speech plus." The "plus" element removes picketing from the realm of pure speech and enables it to be regulated in ways that the Constitution would not tolerate for other forms of communication. The rest of this article will seek to determine which of those two analyses better reconciles constitutional theory and the realities of picketing.
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of Picketing." Suffolk U. L. Rev. 16 (1982): 883-906.