In this paper I address the question whether the law should affirm the offeror's inference and should bind the offeree to the terms proposed by the offeror even in circumstances where the offeree may not intend to accept those terms and where an objective observer might not draw the inference of agreement from the offeree's act. Modem practice and current proposals concerning contract formation in Revised Article 2 and in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (nee Article 2B) press these issues on us more forcefully than old practices and different law did. 1 But contractual autism is not new; it is a familiar part of the law on silence as acceptance, on contract formation and interpretation under section 2-207 of the UCC, and on various other forms of non-verbal acceptance.
White, James J. "Autistic Contracts (Symposium)." Wayne L. Rev. 45, no. 4 (2000): 1693-731.