The Perils of Pandemic Exceptionalism

Authors

Julian Arato, University of Michigan Law SchoolFollow
Kathleen Claussen, University of Miami School of LawFollow
J. Benton Heath, Temple University Beasley School of Law

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2020

Abstract

In response to the pandemic, most states have enacted special measures to protect national economies and public health. Many of these measures would likely violate trade and investment disciplines unless they qualify for one of several exceptions. This Essay examines the structural implications of widespread anticipated defenses premised on the idea of “exceptionalism.” It argues that the pandemic reveals the structural weakness of the exceptions-oriented paradigm of justification in international economic law.

Comments

This article is reproduced with permission from the October 2020 issue of the American Journal of International Law © 2020 American Society of International Law. All rights reserved.

Work published when author not on Michigan Law faculty.

Recommended Citation

Arato, Julian, Kathleen Claussen, and J. Benton Heath. "The Perils of Pandemic Exceptionalism." American Journal of International Law 114, no. 3 (2020): 627-636. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.67